

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02373 01 OF 04 292058Z

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 DODE-00 IO-10 NEA-09 EA-06 EB-07 AID-05

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1491

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2373

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR NATO XJ

SUBJ: NAC CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT GROUP REPORT ON AFRICA SOUTH
OF THE SAHARA

NAC HAS SCHEDULED CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT GROUP REPORT ON AFRICA
SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (TEXT FOLLOWS) FOR MAY 5. ACTION: WASH-
INGTON GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR MAY 5 NAC.

BEGIN TEXT.

I. INTER-AFRICAN RELATIONS

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

1. SOME BLACK AFRICAN STATES HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO
OVERTURES BY SOUTH AFRICA, MORE SPECIFICALLY TO MAKE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN QUESTION. ZAMBIA IS
THE MOST PROMINENT OF THESE. MANY AFRICAN LEADERS, HOWEVER,
DESPITE GRAVE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THE POLICY OF
DIALOGUE APPEAR TO BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IT FOR THE
TIME BEING. AMONG THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THE ALGERIANS WHO WERE
INSTRUMENTAL IN HAVING A SPECIAL OAU MEETING OF FOREIGN MINIS-
TERS CALLED AT DAR ES SALAAM THIS MONTH TO TRY TO FORMULATE
A COMMON OAU POLICY REGARDING STEPS TO BE TAKEN TOWARD SOLUTION
OF THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE ALGERIAN AND OTHER
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PAGE 02 NATO 02373 01 OF 04 292058Z

ARAB OAU MEMBERS APPEAR TO BE MOTIVATED IN THEIR MILITANT STAND
ON SOUTHERN AFRICA CHIEFLY BY THEIR DESIRE TO LEAVE THE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS UNSOLVED WHILE HARNESSING BLACK
AFRICAN SUPPORT TO THEIR PALESTINIAN POLICY.

2. THE POTENTIAL DIVISIVENESS OF THE ERITREAN ISSUE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY OAU MEMBERS. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THIS RECOGNITION MAY BE RESULTING IN A DIMINUTION IN RECENT WEEKS OF THE AID FORMERLY GIVEN TO THE ERITREAN REBELS BY THE RADICAL ARAB STATES, INCLUDING LIBYA. SUDAN HAS MADE ITSELF AVAILABLE AS A MEDIATOR TO BOTH SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT. REGIONAL GROUPINGS

3. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CONTINUES TO BE IN PROFOUND TROUBLE. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION IN AMNY FIELDS. THE POLITICAL DIVERGENCE OF THE THREE EAST AFRICAN MEMBER STATES ARE REFLECTED IN THE SORRY STATE OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS CREATES A PROBLEMATICAL SITUATION FOR THE FUTURE STATE OF MOZAMBIQUE, WHICH HAS ALREADY FORMULATED A POLICY TO ADHERE TO A LARGER EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIC GROUPING.

4. THE ALGERIANS HAV CONTINUED THEIR DRIVE TO PLACE THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA UNDER OAU CONTROL, SO FAR IN THE FACE OF STRONG OPPOSITION FROM NIGERIA AND ECA OFFICIALS THEMSELVES.

5. MEETING IN MONROVIA IN JANUARY, FOURTEEN WEST AFRICAN STATES AGREED TO A DRAFT TREATY SETTING UP A WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TRANSCENDING LINGUISTIC BARRIERS AND BASED UPON THE MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. ADOPTION OF THE TREATY IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE LACE AT A MEETING IN LAGOS LATER THIS YEAR.

II. PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

6. EVENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE LAST YEAR GAVE SOUTH AFRICA AN OPPORTUNITY, WHICH IT HAS SEIZED SWIFTLY, TO ATTEMPT TO BREAK OUT OF THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION IMPOSED ON IT BY THE REST OF AFRICA. THE PRE-ARRANGED EXCHANGES BETWEEN VORSTER AND KAUNDA MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A NEW AND FLUID PERIOD OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE APPARENT ACHIEVEMENT OF A RHODESIAN CEASEFIRE IN DECEMBER GAVE RISE TO VER-OPTIMISM IN SOME QUARTERS. DESPITE SUBSEQUENT DISAPPOINTMENTS, THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN KEPT GOING. MOZAMBIQUE

7. CURRENT INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT AS FROM JUNE 1975 THE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02373 01 OF 04 292058Z

NEWLY INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE WILL BE FACED WITH CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED OPTIONS, AND WILL ADOPT A MODERATE AND CAUTIOUS APPROACH IN DEALING WITH INTERNAL POLICIES AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION. IN THEIR SEARCH FOR MUCH NEEDED AID AND EXPERTIZE, THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT HAVE SOUGHT TO AVOID OVERDEPENDENCE OF ANY ONE GROUP OR BLOC.

8. IN THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANES OF RHODESIA, UNLESS THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROGRESS, FRELIMO WILL BE FACED WITH A DIFFICULT CHOICE BETWEEN ITS ECONOMIC INERESTS AND THE PRESSURE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS. IN THIS LATTER EVENT, IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THE PRECEDENT OF ZAMBIA IN JANUARY 1973, AND APPEAL TO UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER BODIES FOR FINANCIAL AID

TO OFFSET THEIR LOSSES.

RHODESIA

9. SUSTAINED PRESSURE BY SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAMBIA WORKING IN CONJUNCTION BROUGHT ABOUT A NOT WHOLLY EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN RHODESIA IN DECEMBER 1974. DESPITE, HOWEVER, WHITE INTRANSIGENCE (E.G. THE REDETENTION OF SITHOLE) AND DISUNITY AMONGST THE AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, PARTICULARLY ZANU, THE SOUTH AFRICAN/ZAMBIAN PRESSURE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO JOIN FORCES IN AN ENLARGED ANC. SMITH FOR HIS PART, HOWEVER UNWILLINGLY, HAS BEEN FORCED TO GO ALONG WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY OF DETENTE. HE WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO PLAY FOR TIME AND WILL CERTAINLY HAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN CONVINCING HIS WHITE ELECTORATE OF THE NEED TO ACCEPT NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES. FURTHER PROGRESS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE SHORT-TERM BUT THE CHANCES OF A FINAL AGREED SETTLEMENT SEEM TO BE SLIGHT, EVEN THOUGH SOUTH AFRICA APPEARS DETERMINED TO DISENGAGE ITS PARAMILITARY POLICE FROM RHODESIA (A VIEW NOW PUBLICLY EXPRESSED BY THE ZAMBIANS) AND MAY BE UNWILLING TO SOLVE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES FACING RHODESIA IN THE EVENT OF SANCCTIONS BEING ENFORCED BY MOZAMBIQUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 02373 02 OF 04 292124Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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P 291821Z APR 75

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1492

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 2373

SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

10. ESSENTIALLY THE POLICY OF DETENTE HAS INVOLVED FLEXIBILITY OVER RHODESIA AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, NAMIBIA IN THE HOPE OF SECURING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA AND ALSO SECURING AT LEAST A TEMPORARY RESPITE FROM CRITICISM FOR ITS DOMESTIC POLICIES, PARTICULARLY APARTHEID.

11. THIS POLICY OF DETENTE, TO WHICH VORSTER SEEMS NOW WHOLLY COMMITTED, HAS SO FAR HAD SOME SUCCESS PARTICULARLY IN SECURING CLOSE LINKS WITH ZAMBIA AND CONTACTS ELSEWHERE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. AT THE SAME TIME, CERTAIN AFRICAN STATES ARE

BITTERLY OPPOSED TO DETENTE AND THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD OF THE FIERCE ATTACK ON SOUTH AFRICA BEING RESUMED IN THE UNITED NATIONS LATER THIS YEAR BEARING IN MIND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1974 ON NAMIBIA.

12. DETENTE, HOWEVER, MAY WELL RAISE EXPECTATIONS OF REFORMS IN DOMESTIC POLICIES WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO BE FULFILLED. ALTHOUGH SOME CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED RECENTLY, THESE ARE LARGELY COSMETIC AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO THINK THAT IT CAN LIBERALIZE EXTERNAL POLICY BUT STILL RETAIN OR EVEN STRENGTHEN APARTHEID.

13. NEVERTHELESS, THE LOGIC OF EVENTS MAY COMPEL THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO MOVE FURTHER THAN THEY WOULD LIKE AND THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO REGULATE THE SPEED OR THE DEGREE OF CHANGE.

14. ON NAMIBIA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION IS NOT YET CLEAR
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PAGE 02 NATO 02373 02 OF 04 292124Z

ALTHOUGH VORSTER HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE WISHES TO GET THE PROBLEM "OFF HIS BACK". SO FAR NO CONCRETE STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA REMAINS AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE.

15. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IN THEIR VARIOUS FIELDS, SHOULD CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS OF THE NEED FOR MAJOR CHANGES OVER NAMIBIA AND APARTHEID WITHIN A REALISTIC TIME SCALE.

ANGOLA

16. THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING ANGOLA IN 1974 HAD BEEN THE DISUNITY BETWEEN THE 3 COMPETING LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. IN JANUARY 1975 DISCUSSIONS IN MOMBASA LED TO UNITY BETWEEN THE THREE MOVEMENTS IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE OVER INDEPENDENCE. FOLLOWING THE ALGARVE AGREEMENT, THE PORTUGUESE ESTABLISHED AN INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE THREE MOVEMENTS ARE NOW EQUALLY REPRESENTED. THIS COALITION HAS BEEN STRAINED BY RECENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING COLLISIONS BETWEEN ARMED SUPPORTERS OF MPLA AND FNLA BUT PORTUGUESE MEDIATION HAS RESTORED CALM, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE PROBLEM IS ONE WHERE THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF FNLA REINFORCED BY ZAIRIAN SUPPORT IS COUNTERBALANCED BY THE ALLEGEDLY POPULAR STRENGTH OF THE MPLA AND THIS MAY GIVE RISE TO FURTHER DIFFICULTIES. BUT IN THAT EVENT, THE THIRD GROUP, UNITA, MAY HAVE AN IMPORTANT MEDIATING ROLE TO PLAY. THE SIZEABLE EUROPEAN MINORITY (HALF A MILLION STRONG) AND THE EXISTENCE OF A VERY LARGE (ACCORDING TO FNLA SOURCES) EXILED ANGOLAN COMMUNITY IN ZAIRE BOTH REPRESENT ADDITIONAL, BUT IMPONDERABLE, FACTORS IN THE POLITICAL EQUATION.

17. THE FUTURE OF THE OIL-RICH ENCLAVE OF CABINDA REMAINS A FURTHER PROBLEM. BOTH THE CONGO AND ZAIRE SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CABINDA AND THUS MAY CHALLENGE THE GENERALLY HELD VIEW ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ANGOLA, AS WAS SPECIFICALLY LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 3 OF THE ALGARVE AGREEMENT.

III. THE HORN OF AFRICA

18. IN ETHIOPIA, THE "DERG" (PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE CONCIL) SEEMS TO HAVE STRENGTHENED ITS POSITION IN RECENT MONTHS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. ON THE ONE HAND, IT HAS CASHED IN ON THE NATIONALIST FEELINGS ENGENDERED BY THE ERITREAN CONFLICT WHICH, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02373 02 OF 04 292124Z

IT CLAIMS, WAS FOMENTED ABROAD. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT HAS RESPONDED TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE POPULATION BY ITS ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EGALITARIAN AND RADICAL AGRARIAN REFORM.

19. THE ADDIS ABABA GOVERNMENT IS HOWEVER FACED WITH THREE IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING PROBLEMS:

- THE ECONOMIC CRISIS;
- THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM;
- THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN ERITREA.

20. IN THIS LATTER RESPECT, THE SITUATION SEEMS DEADLOCKED AND NO ARMED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IS IN SIGHT. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, THE DERG HAS FOUND INCREASING INTERNATIONAL BACKING FOR ITS STANCE, TO WIT, THE CONFIRMATION BY THE MAJORITY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, THE MODERATION OF THE SUPPORT FOR THE ERITREAN CAUSE VOICED BY CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES, THE ENDORSEMENT OF CHINA, AND TO SOME EXTENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, IN GRANTING ETHIOPIA MILITARY AID, HAS INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH IT ATTACHES TO THE COUNTRY IN TERMS OF THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 02373 03 OF 04 292132Z

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1493

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 2373

21. DESPITE ITS KNOWN CLAIMS TO THE OGADEN REGION, SOMALIA HAS CONTINUED TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF ETHIOPIA'S

CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS ATTITUDE IS TWO-FOLD: FIRST, THE OAU IS CURRENTLY BEING CHAIRED BY PRESIDENT SYAD BARRE AND, SECONDLY, SOMALIA, PERHAPS WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MOSCOW, IS PINNING ITS HOPES ON A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH AN ETHIOPIA IN WHICH THE SOCIALIST REGIME WOULD BE AKIN TO ITS OWN.

22. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, SOMALIA SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN PRIORITY TO THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF DJIBOUTI. WHILE MOGADISHU'S DESIGNS ON DJIBOUTI ARE BECOMING CLEARER, HOWEVER, THERE COULD WELL BE A NATIONALIST REACTION FROM ETHIOPIA WHICH WOULD NOT HAMPER THE IDEOLOGICAL RAPPROCHEMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE.

23. IN ZAIRE, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED FURTHER IN RECENT MONTHS AS A RESULT OF THE DISAPPOINTING PRICE OF COPPER AND THE HIGH LEVEL OF PUBLIC SPENDING.

24. THE STEPS ORDERED BY THE KINSHASA GOVERNMENT TO TACKLE INCIPIENT UNREST AMONG THOSE WHO DID NOT SHARE IN THE ADVANTAGES OF "ZAIRIZATION" MAY HAVE LOST IT THE SUPPORT OF PREVIOUS BENEFICIARIES OF THE REGIME, NAMELY, THE ARMY, SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS.

25. THESE MEASURES, WHICH ARE NOT OF A KIND WHICH CAN SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, COULD ON THE CONTRARY MAKE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02373 03 OF 04 292132Z

THEM EVEN WORSE.

26. THE SITUATION HAS LED TO A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL FOREIGNER INVESTORS. IT HAS EVEN ENGENDERED DOUBT ABOUT THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF THE REGIME.

27. AS REGARDS FOREIGN RELATIONS, DEPSITE CERTAIN RUMBLINGS DIRECTED IN PARTICULAR AT THE WEST AND THE INSPIRATION WHICH PRESIDENT MOBUTU WENT TO FIND IN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA, TERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN ZAIRE'S GENERAL POLICY.

28. IN MADAGASCAR, THERE APPEAR TO BE SOME DIVERGENCIES OF OPINION IN THE 19 MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL SET UP ON 11TH FEBRUARY, FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL RATSIMANDRAVA. GENERAL ANDRIAMHAZO, WHO REPRESENTS THE MODERATES, IS HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME IN HIS EFFORTS TO PLACATE THE EXTREMEISTS LED, MAINLY, BY MR. RATSIRAKA.

29. THE COUNCIL HAS SO FAR SIMPLY PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THE BROAD PROGRAMME OF ACTION ADOPTED BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME WOULD BE CONTINUED, NAMELY, DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIALIST TYPE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

30. THERE IS NO INDICATION AS YET OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS.

IV. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD

31. NOT ALL THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF ARAB POLICY WHICH HAS OCCASIONALLY FALLEN SHORT OF THEIR EXPECTATIONS AS WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE OIL PRODUCERS REFUSED TO GRANT AN AFRICA DEVOID OF LIQUID GOLD A PERFERENTIAL

RATE FOR IT. THE AFRICANS ARE AWARE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR ALLIANCE WITH THE ARABS WHOSE INTERESTS OFTEN DIFFER FROM THOSE OF BLACK AFRICA. THE WEST SHOULD NOT FOREGO THAT THIS ARAB-AFRICAN "MARRIAGE OF REASON" IS NOT NECESSARILY A PERMANENT ONE AND DOES NOT EMBRACE ALL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY.

32. IT IS NONETHELESS FELT THAT THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THIS NEW ARAB-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY WILL LAST FOR AS LONG AS THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE AND THE RACIAL ISSUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. THUS, MR. ARAFAT, THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE, HAS BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING OF THE OAU.

33. CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE IDEA OF TRIANGULAR
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PAGE 03 NATO 02373 03 OF 04 292132Z

CO-OPERATION (AFRICA, THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE WEST) IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT AID. THE BULK OF FUNDS WOULD BE SUPPLIED BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT WOULD COME FROM THE INDUSTRIALIZED WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE BENEFICIARIES BEING THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THIS FORMULA WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES AMONG THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED ARE:

(A) THE MORE RATIONAL USE OF PART OF THE CURRENCIES WHICH ARE HELD BY THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAMPER THE CHANGES WHICH THE WEST WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM;

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PAGE 01 NATO 02373 04 OF 04 292145Z

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1494

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 2373

(B) NEW COMMERCIAL OUTLETS FOR THE WESTERN ECONOMIES;
(C) THE ACQUISITION BY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF EXPERIENCE WHICH THEY COULD PUT TO USE IN THEIR OWN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

34. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE

UNDERLYING THIS FORM OF TRIANGULAR CO-OPERATION AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT IN CERTAIN SPECIFIC INSTANCES, ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO THE DANGER OF ATTRACTING PUBLICITY WHICH MIGHT EMBARRASS THE ARABS AND THE AFRICANS. THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR A CAUTIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THIS FORMULA ON ARAB-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY. IF IT COULD BE APPLIED EFFICIENTLY AND TACTFULLY, IT MIGHT PERHAPS TEMPER THE ANTAGONISM WHICH SOMETIMES DIVIDES THE AFRICAN AND ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE WEST.

AFRICA AND THE WEST

35. TWO SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE WEST OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAVE BEEN THE LOME CONVENTION (FEBRUARY) AND THE BANGUI CONFERENCE (MARCH).

36. IT WAS WITH GENERAL SATISFACTION ALL ROUND THAT THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES SIGNED THE LOME CONVENTION WITH THE COMMON MARKET NINE. THIS CONVENTION IS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN THE QUEST FOR NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THE FRENCH SPEAKING COUNTRIES OF AFRICA WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE MACHINERY FOR STABILIZING EXPORT EARNINGS AND WELCOMED ASSISTANCE WITH CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02373 04 OF 04 292145Z

INDUSTRIALIZATION SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIO THAT THE EXTENSION OF THE NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES FROM 19 TO 46 COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT ENTAIL A REDUCTION OF EDF CREDITS FOR THE COUNTRIES ASSOCIATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE YAOUNDE AGREEMENT. FEELINGS OF THIS KIND WERE VOICED DURING THE CONFERENCE AT BANGUI ATTENDED BY FRANCE AND THE MAJORITY OF THE FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE LOME CONVENTION WILL LEAD TO THE ADOPTION BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF A MORE OUTGOING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WEST IN BODIES SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS.

37. AS REGARDS FINANCIAL MATTERS, IT WAS AGREED AT THE BANGUI CONFERENCE THAT A WAY SHOULD BE FOUND OF LINKING THE DTS WITH DEVELOPMENT AID.

SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCES

38. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECTACULAR INCREASE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE, THE USSR HAS NONETHELESS CONTINUED TO MAKE HEADWAY IN THE COUNTRIES WHERE IT HAS HAD A FOOTHOLD FOR SOMETIME (SOMALIA, GUINEA, DAHOMEY AND UGANDA) AND IS CURRENTLY SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN WHICH HAS AS ITS SLOGAN "INDIAN OCEAN, A ZONE OF PEACE". IT HAS NOT SO FAR OBTAINED, OR PROBABLY EVEN ASKED FOR, PERMANENT FACILITIES IN THE PORTS OF MADAGASCAR OR MAURITIUS. IT IS TOO EARLY AS YET TO KNOW WHETHER THE RUSSIANS CAN OBTAIN A GREATER SAY THAN THE CHINESE IN THE INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE OF TOMORROW. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ERITREAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT IS PERHAPS AN INDICATION OF ITS CONCERN THAT THE RED SEA SHOULD NOT COME UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE ARABS.

39. CHINA IS PRESSING AHEAD WITH ITS ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. THE SPECTACULAR TANZAM PROJECT IN TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA IS NEARING COMPLETION. IN

SOMALIA WORK IS CONTINUING ON THE TRANS-SOMALIAN ROAD WHICH RUNS ALONG THE EDGE OF THE OGADEN. CHINA HAS GRANTED ITS SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY REGIME IN ETHIOPIA. IN MOZAMBIQUE, IT IS CONTINUING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE FRELIMO WHOSE LEADER, MR. SAMORA MACHEL, RECENTLY PAID AN EXTENDED VISIT TO PEKING; THE SPEECHES MADE DURING THIS VISIT SHOW THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE ON EXCELLENT TERMS. IN CENTRAL AFRICA, CHINA IS GETTING ON BETTER WITH GENERAL MOBUTU AND IN ANGOLA IS ATTEMPTING TO CHECK SOVIET INFLUENCE BASED ON THE MPLA.

40. ANOTHER POINT WORTH NOTING IS THAT PEKING SHOWED SIGNS OF SATISFACTION WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE LOME CONVENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02373 04 OF 04 292145Z

WHICH IT INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE THAT THE WEST COULD BE FORCED TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE THIRD WORLD IN ORDER TO ESCAPE THE DOMINATION OF THE TWO SUPER POWERS.
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